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Jesting in Earnest in Love’s Labour’s
Lost
Claire Guéron
1 In  his  introduction to  the  Arden edition of  Love’s  Labour’s  Lost,  Henry  Woudhuysen
suggests that the main difficulty facing directors and actors of the play is “judging the
play’s tone”.1 He goes on to describe the difficulty as a matter of assessing the degree of
seriousness to be attached to a given scene or action. Adducing the opening oath-taking
scene as an example, he asks, “how seriously is an audience to take the play’s opening
vows?”2 
2 In this paper, I would like to argue that the tonal indeterminacy Woudhuysen identifies
as  a  directing  challenge  is  also  a  structural  feature  of  the  play,  and  part  of  an
underlying discourse about shifting assumptions and values. In order to narrow the
field,  I  will  confine  the  scope  of  my  discussion  to  a  specific  instance  of  tonal
indeterminacy which I will hereafter refer to as the “dubious jest”. By this I mean a
statement that leaves the listener – on or off stage – wondering whether the words are
to be taken at face value, or as a joke. I will first demonstrate the prevalence of such
statements in the play through a few choice examples and discuss what makes their
seriousness so difficult to determine. I will then argue that these statements share a
pattern, involving promises and hyperbole. This pattern allows the play to point away
from  the  immediate  dramatic  context  and  towards  courtroom  hermeneutics  as
providing a possible interpretative blueprint. This detour by way of legal hermeneutics
will lead to an emphasis on performance as the arbitrator of meaning, as well as on the
axiological dimension of performative choices. I will conclude by suggesting that Love’s




3 In the first act, when the King of Navarre reminds a reluctant Berowne that he swore
an oath to fast and study with him for three years, the latter replies that he “swore in
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jest” (I.i.54).4 The statement is a masterpiece of ambiguity. For one thing, given the
sacred, performative and self-validating dimension of an oath, it is not immediately
clear  what  “swearing in  jest”  implies,  or  even whether  it  is  not  a  contradiction in
terms. For another, given the jocularity already displayed in the scene, the disclaimer
itself, rather than the original oath, may be “in jest”. In other words, Berowne may be
joking about joking. The indeterminacy is amplified by the fact that the spoken oath, as
opposed to the signing ceremony, took place off stage, in the story time before the
beginning of the dramatic action, so that the tone in which the words were spoken is
withheld from the audience, though not from the other characters. 
4 Berowne’s disclaimer sets a pattern for the rest of the play, involving statements whose
degree of seriousness is obfuscated or problematic. The most remarkable of these may
be Longaville’s proclamation that any woman coming within a mile of Navarre’s court
will “lose her tongue” (I.i.122). It seems that the clause is not to be taken seriously, as
Longaville assures a shocked Berowne that it is meant primarily as a deterrent. In fact,
by  the  time  the  Princess  and  her  retinue  arrive,  the  clause  has  been  effectively
forgotten by all concerned, and the otherwise well-informed ladies do not even bother
to mention it.  And yet,  we remain uncomfortably aware that  the mutilation clause
remains inscribed in the decree, and thus officially “on the books”. 
5 The  ladies,  too,  are  given  to  ambiguous  statements,  as  when  the  hunting  Princess
announces that she will claim she missed on purpose if she fails to hit a deer. This
seems to be a joke, given that the excuse is formulated before the fact and explicitly
identified as a form of rationalization; yet the context suggests genuine compassion for
the hunted animal, and creates indeterminacy as to whether the Princess is shooting to
kill. The Princess again indulges in obfuscation near the end of the play. Bookending
Longaville’s  threat  of  mutilation,  the  Princess  “protest[s]”  she would not  enter  the
King’s palace, even at the risk of enduring “a world of torments” (V.ii.352-354). This
would seem an obvious exaggeration, had the Princess not previously emphasized the
binding  nature  of  the  words  “I  protest”  (II.i.155).  When  the  King  of  Navarre
“protest[ed]” that he had never received payment from the King of France, the Princess
“arrest[ed his] word” (II.i.157). 
6 At stake in these dubious jests  is  the kind of  world that  is  being represented.  In a
realistic world, for example, the issue of whether the young men’s vows are to be taken
seriously would be a moot point. How can a promise to abstain from food and sleep be
anything  but a  joke?  Assessing  the  kind  of  world  being  represented  is  of  course
primarily  a  generic  issue.  Taking the  simple  Aristotelian definition of  tragedy as  a
serious genre, and of comedy as being about trivial matters, we – if not the characters –
should be able to lift some of the indeterminacies mentioned above. For example, given
the play’s billing as “pleasant comedy”, it would seem obvious that Longaville’s decree
about cutting out women’s tongues is not to be taken seriously. After all, this is not
Titus  Andronicus.  However,  invoking  genre  as  a  hermeneutics is  a  tricky  business.
Though  a  play’s  billing  is  one  indication,  our  classification  of  Shakespeare’s  plays
derives mainly from the 1623 Folio, which made some questionable choices, such as
classifying Cymbeline as a tragedy. Besides, Love’s Labour’s Lost’s status as a comedy is
notoriously iffy,  as hinted meta-dramatically by Berowne’s statement that the story
“does not end like an old play” (V.ii.842). Ultimately, then, determining genre must be
based on the text itself,  which makes any attempt at invoking genre as a means of
interpreting statements a circular process, or at best a heuristic one. 
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7 Similarly, invoking form will not get the hearer or reader very far in assessing whether
to take a statement as a joke or not. That is because the dubious jests referred to above
are based on two patterns not instantly recognizable as markers of facetiousness. These
patterns include a speech-act, namely the promise, or statement of intention, and a
trope,  the  hyperbole.  Berowne’s  opening  statement  that  he  “swore  in  jest”  clearly
partakes of  both figures,  involving a promise to abstain from basic  necessities  that
could  be  taken  as  an  overemphatic  way  of  saying  that  he  will  study  very  hard.
Similarly, when the Princess “rates” the lords’ words of praise as “pleasant jest” (V.ii.
754), she is referring to hyperbolic eulogizing, combined with an implicit, but insincere,
promise to wed. 
8 Though false promises and hyperbole do appear as figures of jesting in Quintilian’s
Institutes,5 most classical and Renaissance treatises put the main emphasis on another
classification,  derived  from  Cicero’s  De Oratore.  In  Cicero’s  classification,  jokes  are
divided into two main categories, which include the amusing anecdote and the clever
rejoinder, or one-liner.6 The main difference between such jokes and those involving
promises  and/or  hyperbole  is  one  of  framing.  Anecdotes  and  one-liners  may  be
formally set apart from serious discourse, as in such introductory clauses as, “did you
hear the one about the traveling salesman?” These frames make uptake or recognition
of the jesting mode easy. The problem with jokes based on promises and hyperbole is
that they are formally no different from serious statements. In Love’s Labour’s Lost, this
problem is  brought home by an emphasis  on the framing devices that characterize
conventional forms of speech such as the sonnet, the eulogy, the love letter, the Latin
quote or the legal edict. In the absence of formal markers, recognizing a promise or
hyperbolic statement as a joke is a matter of extrapolating the speaker’s meaning, or
intention, based on factors lying outside the words of the statement itself. 
9 However, the form of Love Labour’s Lost’s dubious jests may be seen as a help as well as a
hindrance.  This  is  because  unmeant  promises  and  hyperbolic  statements  do  not
automatically fall under the category of jokes. They are perhaps more readily identified
as lies,  bragging, poetic fancy, or idle threats.  In fact,  George Puttenham called the
hyperbole the “loud lyar” in his quirky classification of traditional figures of speech,7
and  Quintilian  associated  jesting  with  lying.8 The  many  forms  of  untruthfulness
associated  with  promising  and  exaggerating  allow  the  play  to  align  ambiguous
statements  belonging  to  different  realms  of  discourse,  suggesting  a  possible
transference of hermeneutic method from one realm to another.
 
2. The use of courtroom hermeneutics 
10 Shakespeare’s decision to introduce joking in the form of promises and/or hyperbole
allows him to extend the dynamics of jesting to discursive activities normally thought
of as serious. These include Petrarchan love poetry, which is based on the hyperbolic
image of the woman as a goddess, as well as forms of legal discourse involving a threat
of disproportionate punishment as a deterrent to crime. The play in fact illustrates the
kind of mental gymnastics by which these figures can serve as a gateway from one
realm  of  discourse  to  another.  In  particular,  the  mercurial  nature  of  hyperbole  is
underscored by its subtle transference from a realm where it is to be expected – love
poetry  –  to  one  where  it  is  not,  i.e.  legal  language.  When  Longaville  attempts  to
rationalize his deviation from his vow not to associate with women, he argues that as
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his lady is a goddess, and not a woman, he hasn’t broken his vow (IV.iii.56-57). This
relocation of Petrarchan hyperbole to the quasi-legal realm of formal oaths may be
taken as  the  character’s  sophistry,  but  it  also  suggests  the  possibility  of  importing
hermeneutic  patterns  from  one  realm  to  another.  In  particular,  the  play’s  use  of
hyperbole and broken promises suggests that means of establishing intention in the
courtroom may also apply to the interpretation of jokes. 
11 The problem of assessing intention was in fact a topical one when Shakespeare was
writing Love’s Labour’s Lost, in particular in the realm of the law. As scholars such as
Lorna  Hutson,  Charles  Spinosa  and  Luke  Wilson  have  pointed  out,  establishing
intention was an increasingly central concern in legal practice, appearing in at least
three late sixteenth-century developments.9 The first of these developments was the
new prominence of actions of assumpsit, meaning “he undertook” or “he promised”, by
which private deals were framed as contracts, or promises to deliver, as opposed to
immediately effective transfers of goods. The second, relating to criminal trials, was
the  practice  of  encoding  criminal  intention  in  the  circumstances  of  the  crime,  as
opposed to associating it with the criminal’s actual state of mind. Luke Wilson refers to
this development as the “modularity of intention”,10 meaning that intention was now
detachable  from  the  individual  conscience.  The  third  development  was  the
introduction  of  the  principle  of  equity  into  the  common  law  courts.  Equity,  the
principle of mitigating the harshness of the letter of the law in particular cases, was
traditionally the precinct of the courts of Chancery. In the sixteenth-century, as Lorna
Hutson has shown, Edmund Plowden’s Commentaries brought equity to the common law,
and defined it as a matter of establishing the lawmaker’s original intention.11 The three
developments established intention – both the defendant and the lawmaker’s – as a
crucial  elements  in  legal  practice,  but  also  as  something  to  be  reconstructed,  or
retrospectively imagined. Of the three developments, I would argue that the principle
of equity is the most relevant to Love’s Labour’s Lost.
12 In the play, the principle of equity, though not evoked explicitly, seems to underpin the
way  laws,  edicts  and  proclamations  are  enforced.  The  harshness  of  the  law  is
systematically  mitigated,  as  when  the  clause  about  women  losing  their  tongues  is
forgotten, or when the year-long penalty for consorting with a woman is reduced from
a year to a week, then to a few hours in Costard’s case. However, the actual workings of
equity are illustrated in less obvious places as well. Berowne’s somewhat sophistical
analysis of the purpose of the edict he is so reluctant to sign appears as something of a
parody of the intellectual process behind the practice of equity. 
BEROWNE. What is the end of study, let me know?
KING. Why, that to know which else we should not know.
BEROWNE. Things hid and barred, you mean, from common sense?
KING. Ay, that is study’s god-like recompense.
BEROWNE. Come on then, I will swear to study so
To know the thing I am forbid to know:
And thus, to study well where I may dine,
When I to feast expressly am forbid;
Or study where to meet some mistress fine, 
When mistresses from common sense are hid;
Or having sworn too hard-a-keeping oath, 
Study to break it and not break my troth.
I.i.55-66
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With this Socratic line of questioning, Berowne is – facetiously – attempting to replace
the letter of the law with its spirit, or original intention. He is arguing that the spirit of
the law is  the  promotion of  study,  and that  the method used to  reach that  goal  –
corresponding to the letter of the law – is irrelevant. This is the legal principle of pro
bono publico or “the public good”, by which the broader purpose of a law trumps its
specific provisions. The irony, here, is that Berowne is reconstructing original intention
in the presence of the framer, the King himself, rather, as in equitable reconstruction,
than compensating for the framer’s absence with an act of imaginative extrapolation.
This,  of  course,  draws attention to the necessarily  fictitious dimension of  equitable
reconstruction, and to its performative nature. 
 
3. Performance as the arbitrator of intention 
13 The fictitious dimension of equitable reconstruction is apparent in Edmund Plowden’s
explanation of how equity is applied by the judiciary:
And  in  order  to  form  a  right  judgement  when  the  letter  of  a  Statute  is
restrained, and when enlarged, by Equity, it is a good Way, when you peruse
a Statute, to suppose that the Law-maker is present, and that you have asked
him the Question you want to know touching the Equity, then you must give
yourself such an Answer as you imagine he would have done, if he had been
present.12
In  Plowden’s  instructions,  as  has  often  been  noted,13 the  judge  is  being  asked  to
reconstruct the lawmaker’s intention by what amounts to turning him into a dramatic
character, and placing him in a scene with himself. This dramatization of the legal text
highlights  the  similarity  between a  judge  working  his  way  back  to  the  lawmaker’s
original  intention  and  a  reader  of  a  play  attempting  to  assess  a  character’s  tone,
meaning the way he or she intends his or her words to be taken. It is a truism that a
character has no existence outside of the dramatic text. This is not strictly true of the
legislator,  who  once  lived,  but  for  all  intents  and  purposes,  the  lawmaker  is  only
present in the text of the law. In both cases, it is to be noted, intention is established in
the shift from text to performance. Yet this requires some discussion of the possible
meanings of “performance”.
14 As  Luke  Wilson  reminds  us,14 Shakespeare  was  writing  at  a  time  when  the  word
“performance” was shifting from its promissory to its theatrical meaning. The terms
refer respectively to “performing what one has promised to do”, and “performing a
play”. When it comes to determining whether a promise is to be taken at face value or
as  a  joke,  both  meanings  are  relevant.  To  illustrate  the  way  performance  clarifies
intention  in  the  promissory  sense,  we  may  adduce  the  example  of  the  Princess’s
hunting expedition.  The ambiguity  created by the Princess’  equivocation about  her
intention  to  hit  the  deer  is  definitively  lifted  in  the  next  scene,  when  a  dialogue
between  Holofernes  and  Nathaniel  conveys  the  information  that  the  Princess  has
indeed  performed  the  act  of  bringing  down  the  deer.  Yet  the  proximity  of  the
promissory  and  the  theatrical  meanings  of  “performance”  suggests  that  dramatic
performance  may be  another  way  of  establishing  intention.  If  we  now turn  to  the
eavesdropping scene (IV.iii.1-210), in which the lords overhear each other reading their
love sonnets out loud, and compare it with the one in which the ladies read the same
sonnets in silence (V.ii.1-78), we may note a hermeneutic discordance. When the young
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men  hear  and  watch  each  other  performing  the  sonnets,  they  are  immediately
convinced of their sincerity. However, when the young ladies read the sonnets, they
dismiss them as “hypocrisy” (V.ii.31) and “pleasant jest” (V.ii.754). Of course, the young
men’s performance is of words they have written themselves. The situation is different
for actors or stage directors, for whom performance involves interpretative choices.
Such interpretative activity, the play emphasizes, is ultimately a matter of projecting
values, a matter of ethics. 
15 The connection between jokes and ethics goes back at least to Cicero. Though Cicero’s
De Oratore does not explicitly link joking with values, the connection was implicit in his
use of jokes in the courtroom. As Anthony Corbeill points out in Controlling Laughter,
jokes “simultaneouly creat[ed] and enforc[ed] the community’s ethical values”.15 This
seems to follow naturally from Cicero’s discussion of jesting in De Oratore, where he
described  “deformity”16 as  the  most  laugh-worthy  object.  For  Cicero,  physical
deformity reflected moral deformity, so that laughter was seen as the natural response
to ugliness and immorality. The implication was that in order to laugh together, people
needed to agree about what was ugly or immoral. This connection between laughter
and a shared ethics also implies that ambiguous jokes reflect conflicting values. 
16 In  the  play,  ambiguous  expressions  of  intention  are  connected  with  shifting  or
problematic values, in particular through contextual or topical allusions. One example
is the Princess’s profession of pity for the deer she is about to kill and her description of
herself as a “murderer” (IV.i.8). The Princess explicitly relates her own equivocation to
the paradoxical standards of her society, in which “shooting well is [...] accounted ill”
(IV.i.25). In this instance, as Edward Berry and Matthew Cartmill have pointed out, the
world  of  the  play  mirrors  Elizabethan  society,  with  its  contending  and  conflicting
attitudes towards hunting. Both critics have linked the Princess’s expression of pity for
the hunted animal with George’s Gascoigne’s Art of  Venerie,  each section of which is
prefaced by a poem in the animal’s voice, complaining about the cruelty of man. The
Hart’s preface is a case in point:
I am the Harte, by Greekes surnamed so
Bicause my heade, doth with their tearmes agree
For stately shape, fewe such on earth do go,
So that by right, they have so termed mee.
For Kings delight, it seemes I was ordeyned
Whose huntsmen yet, pursue me day by day,
In Forest, chace and Park, I am constrayned,
Before their Houndes, to wander many away.
Wherefore who lyst, to learne the perfect trade,
Of Venerie: and therewithall would knowe,
What properties, and vertues nature made,
In one (poore Hart, oh harmlesse Hart) to growe,
Let him giue ear, to skilfull Trystam’s lore,
To Phoebus, Fowylloux, and many more.17
17 Significantly, though, Berry and Cartmill disagree about whether these poems should
be taken as the author’s expression of compassion for hunted game, or as a joke. In
Berry’s words: 
Although Matt Cartmill (A View to a Death in the Morning; 82-83) suggests that
the device might have been intended as a joke, and therefore might imply no
sympathy for the animals themselves, Gascoigne’s ambiguous social position
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and his cynicism toward war are more likely to have made him genuinely
ambivalent about the very art that he describes.18
Such ethical tensions, in a given culture, may be a prelude to a paradigm shift, a change
in  the  culture’s  values.  In  Love’s  Labour’s  Lost,  choosing  dubious  promises  as  the
template  for  tonal  indeterminacy  allows  Shakespeare  to  emphasize  the  time  gap
between statement of  intent and performance,  and to associate  that  time gap with
axiological change. A hint of this connection between changing times and changing
values  appears  in  Berowne’s  excuse  for  the  lords’  failure  to  perform  the  promise
inscribed in the edict. When unmasked by Costard’s production of his love letter to
Rosaline, Berowne cries out: “young blood doth not obey an old decree” (IV.iii.208). The
statement is somewhat paradoxical, given that the “old decree” was made only days
previously, by the lords themselves, when they were necessarily even younger than
they  are  now.19 Though  Berowne  here  seems  to  be  opposing  youthful  vigour  and
austere age, he is also measuring the time elapsed between the framing of a law and its
enforcement in terms of change ,  and asserting the primacy of the new order. This
awareness of changing values is implicit in Plowden’s definition of equity, which we
will now briefly return to. 
18 Returning to Plowden’s text, we may wonder how the method is to be applied. What, in
particular, is implied by imagining “what [the lawmaker] would have done, had he been
here”? Is the judge supposed to imagine the lawmaker stepping out of his historical era
decked out in old-fashioned clothes, speech and values, or is he to imagine a spruced up
and updated version of the lawmaker more in tune with the times? Should the judge
extract the original lawmaker’s standards and apply them to the circumstances of the
case, or is he expected to imagine what the lawmaker would have said had he been
alive “today” and thus presumably partaken of the new standards of the time? This is a
problem routinely confronted in American law,  where Supreme Court  Justices have
introduced  the  concept  of  “evolving  standards  of  decency”20 in  order  to  make  the
original intent of the framers of the constitution compatible with changing mores. No
such  teleological  concept  existed  in  Shakespeare’s  day,  yet  an  awareness  of  the
contingency  of  religious  and  moral  values  existed,  as  expressed,  for  example,  in
Montaigne’s “Apologie de Raymond de Sebonde”.21 Let us note that Plowden’s phrasing
is  sufficiently  vague to  accommodate  a  conception of  equitable  reconstruction that
involves some degree of projection.
19 A hint that projection is similarly appropriate when assessing jokes appears near the
end of the play when Rosaline tells Berowne that “a jest’s propensity lies in the ear/ Of
him that hears it, never in the tongue/ Of him that makes it” (V.ii.829-831). This can be
taken as a meta-dramatic hint that the audience is the ultimate arbitrator of whether a
statement is to be taken as a joke or not. The audience’s response will of course be
mediated by the stage manager’s choices and the actor’s performance. These in turn
will  be  highly  affected  by  the  times  and  mores  of  the  culture  presenting  the
performance. 
20 Though we can only guess, it seems inevitable that the tone of Love’s Labour’s Lost was
intrinsically different in the late sixteenth-century from what it  is  in performances
today. For example, Berowne’s semi-Petrarchan conceit about “Love’s Tyburn” (IV.iii.
46) would probably have carried darker undertones at a time when public hangings
were routinely carried out, just as his remark about the plague (V.ii.421) would have
spoken to real fears in the audience, at a time when the disease was still a frequent
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caller to London. One speculates that as Western society moved towards a “kinder,
gentler” set of values and realities, jokes about brutal death would lose their sting and
the “pleasant comedy” would become even more pleasant. 
21 It is thus inevitable that our interpretation of ambiguous jokes should involve a degree
of projection. In deciding whether or not to take a statement as a joke, audiences must
choose  among  a  cornucopia  of  axiological  frameworks,  including,  perhaps
overwhelmingly,  the dominant values of  their  own culture.  The play’s  emphasis  on
making  the  recipient  the  arbitrator  of  intention  lends  certain  legitimacy  to  the
audience’s semi-instinctive projection of the standards of their own time and culture
onto the text of the play. By our standards, Longaville must be joking about cutting out
women’s tongues, because he is characterized as a pleasant young man and pleasant
young men don’t believe in maiming women. Similarly, the Princess must be joking
about “enduring a thousand torments” because after all, she is a lively lady and lively
ladies don’t go in for martyrdom. 
22 And yet, as we have seen, the play does not entirely let us get away with these glib
assumptions. At least the written text does not, though a sufficiently upbeat production
may22. A sense of lingering discomfort hovers over these doubtful jests thanks in part to
the play’s generic indeterminacies. Thus even as the play authorizes a soft reading, in
which characters behave as they would in our own culture, it reminds us that what is
clearly  a  joke  in  one  set  of  circumstances  may  become  dead  serious  in  even  only
slightly  altered  circumstances.  Longaville’s  contribution  to  the  proclamation,  in
particular, is a reminder that given the right circumstances, a well-spoken young man
may be capable of unspeakable acts. 
23 The play thus emphasizes the contingency of a joke’s effect, in a departure from the
stance  taken  by  most  Renaissance  treatises  on  jesting.  Most  of  these,  including
Balthazar Castiglione’s Book of the Courtier, and Thomas Wilson’s Art of Rhetoric, take up
Cicero’s rules and examples as if they were timeless and universal. As Barbara Bowen
points out, “considering how un-funny most of Cicero’s facetiae are, we wonder why so
many  of  them  survived  unchanged  through  the  Renaissance”.23 This  “recycling  of
Ciceronian jokes”,24 as Bowen calls it,  is consistent with the backward and imitative
thrust of humanist writing, and with the resulting temptation to evade the issue of
axiological change. In contrast, Love’s Labour’s Lost, with its foreign visitors and ghostly
fathers, exhibits an awareness of other times and other places, and the hermeneutic
difficulty of communicating across cultural lines.
24 Shakespeare’s use of ambiguous joking in Love’s Labour’s Lost offers an illustration of the
definition of a play as “a mirror held up to nature” quite different from that evoked in
Hamlet, a play written about seven years later. In Shakespeare’s most famous tragedy,
the eponymous Prince of Denmark explained that a play was a chronicle of the time
(II.ii.515).  This  is  consistent  with  the  tragic  genre,  and  its  close  association  with
historical time. In Love’s Labour’s Lost, however, Shakespeare suggests that a play may
act as a mirror of the audience’s time. Love’s Labour’s Lost,  then, is “a mirror held up
nature”, but one that moves beyond the topicality of satire, or even the universality of
moral allegory, and is made to mirror the values of whatever culture its director and
audience belong to, while exposing those values as both contingent and brittle. 
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Berowne’s feeble defense, when challenged by the King, that his vow to fast and remain celibate
for three years at the court of Navarre was made “in jest” (I.i.54) ushers in a pattern of authorial
obfuscation concerning whether characters’ statements are to be taken at face value or as jokes.
Though Shakespeare withholds conclusive textual evidence, such indeterminacies cannot easily
be shrugged off as “hors-texte”, as they are given prominence in the play by providing backbone
to  the  plot,  which  can  broadly  be  read  as  the  women’s  attempt  to  gauge  the  young  men’s
seriousness and reliability, and also through alignment with contemporary legal debates around
the issues of criminal intention and equity. With its invocation of courtroom hermeneutics, the
play suggests that performative reconstruction is the key to establishing a fictional speaker’s
intention. Such reconstruction, in the playhouse as in the courtroom, implies a projection of new
standards onto an old text.  Ultimately,  then,  Love’s  Labour’s  Lost’s dubious jests  highlight  the
contigency of moral values, and their fragility.
Lorsque le roi de Navarre rappelle à Berowne qu’il a juré de passer trois années de jeune et de
célibat à la cour, celui-ci répond que ce serment n’était que simple boutade. Sur le même modèle,
on relève dans la pièce une récurrence d’énoncés dont le niveau de sérieux est difficile à jauger.
Si le texte ne permet pas de trancher, ces ambiguïtés ne peuvent pas non plus être reléguées au
« hors-texte »,  dans  la  mesure  où  la  pièce  les  met  en  exergue,  d’abord  en  les  associant  au
mouvement de l’intrigue (qu’on peut assimiler aux efforts déployés par les quatre jeunes femmes
pour  éprouver  le  sérieux  des  jeunes  lords),  mais  aussi  en  les  rapportant  aux  discussions
juridiques de l’époque portant sur l’intention criminelle et sur l’équité. Par son invocation de
l’herméneutique  juridique,  la  pièce  laisse  entendre  que  c’est  à  travers  un  processus  de
reconstruction qu’apparaît l’intention du locuteur. Que ce soit au tribunal ou au théâtre, une
telle reconstruction sous-entend une projection de normes nouvelles sur un texte ancien. En
définitive, les plaisanteries ambiguës de Love’s Labour’s Lost mettent en évidence la contingence
des valeurs morales, ainsi que leur fragilité.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Peines d’amour perdues, boutade, équité, représentation, éthique, promesse,
hyperbole
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